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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PERMISSIVE LEGISLATION: THE
UNION SHOP PROVISION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR
ACT v. STATE "RIGHT TO WORK" LAWS*
SECTION 2 (11) of the Railway Labor Act 1 authorizes the creation of union
shop trade agreements between railroad carriers and certified labor organiza-
tions.2 This 1951 amendment permits making membership in a labor organi-
zation a condition of continued employment, notwithstanding state laws to
*Hanson v. Union Pac. R.R., 71 N.W.2d 526 (Neb. 1955), appeal docketed sub non.
Railway Employees' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 350 U.S. 910 (1955); Hudson v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441 (1955), petition for cert. filed, 24 U.S.L.
WEEK 3147 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1955) (No. 517).
1. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1952)
"Eleventh. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other
statute or law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier
or carriers as defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations
duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with the re-
quirements of this chapter shall be permitted-
"(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that
within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date
of such agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of
the labor organization representing their craft or class: Provided, That no such
agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to employees to
whom membership is not available uron the same terms and conditions as are gen-
erally applicable to any other member or with respect to employees to whom mem-
bership was denied or terminated for any reason other than the failure of the em-
ployee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including
fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
"(b) to make agreements providing for the deduction by such carrier or carriers
from the wages of its or their employees . . . of any periodic dues, initiation fees,
and assessments ... : Provided, That no such agreement shall be effective ... until
he [employee] shall have furnished the employer with a written assignment to the
labor organization of such membership dues, initiation fees, and assessments. . .
2. The Act also authorizes a checkoff by the employer of union dues, fees and assess-
ments, with the consent of the employee. Ibid.
The following are definitions of terms pertinent to § 2(11) of the RLA:
(a) union security-various agreements between employer and union, assuring the
union either stable membership, or stable income, or both.
(b) union shop-an agreement between employer and union, allowing the employer to
hire nonunion employees on condition that they become members of the union within a
specified time, and thereafter maintain membership in good standing in order to retain their
jobs.
(c) checkoff-a payroll deduction plan for union dues, fees and assessments.
See, generally, Murphy, The "Right to Work" Statute, 26 Miss. L.J. 39-41 (1954);
Rosenthal, The National Labor Relations Act and Compulsory Unionism, 1954 Wis. L.
REv. 53,55 ,n.4.
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the contrary.3 Section 2(11) constitutes a complete reversal of the 1934
amendment to the Act, which prohibited a union shop.4 It differs from the
union shop amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act,5 which does not invalidate
state laws barring union security agreements,0 the so-called "right to work"
laws.7 The union shop amendment to the RLA has provoked much contro-
versy concerning two problems: (1) Is the constitutionality of section 2(11)
in issue when a dispute arises over the enforcement of a union shop trade
agreement? (2) If so, is section 2(11) constitutional?
In two recent cases involving similar facts, state courts have reached opposite
conclusions on both questions.8 In Hanson v. Union Pacific R.R.9 and Hudson
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,' 0 the carriers entered, pursuant to section 2(11),
3. Contracts requiring actual membership in a union, as distinguished from mere
tender of dues, fees and assessments, are authorized by § 2(11) of the RLA. Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on the Study to Amend the Railway Labor Act of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1950) (hereinafter cited
as Hearings) ; Pan American Airways, Inc., 20 Lab. Arb. 312 (1953) ; Note, 52 MicH. L.
RPv. 619 (1954) ; cf. Cogen, Is Joining the Union Required in the Taft-Hartley Union
Shop?, 5 LAB. L.J. 659 (1954). But see Toner, The Union Shop Under Taft-Hartley, 5
LAB. L.J. 552 (1954). See text at note 52 infra.
4. 64 STAT. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152(11)(d) (1952), amending 48 STAT. 1186
(1934). The legislative history of this series of union security amendments to the RLA
is summarized in H.R. REP. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1950).
5. 61 STAT. 140-41 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952), amending 49 STAT. 452
(1935).
6. 49 STAT. 457 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 164 (1952).
7. Seventeen states have statutory or constitutional provisions outlawing the union
shop. See Note, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 773, 774 n.10 (1956). In the absence of federal law to
the contrary, state right to work laws have been upheld. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v.
Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) ; AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S.
538 (1949).
However, the above cases concerned industrial unions, not railroad unions. It might
well be argued that states lack concurrent jurisdiction to regulate labor relations in the
railroad industry, due to the national scope of the activity. See Cooley v. Port Wardens,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1981). But the presumption is against this interpretation. See
Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Co., supra; Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona
cx rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
8. The following cases have held that the constitutionality of § 2(11) of the RLA was
not properly in issue: Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Wicks v.
Southern Pac. Co., 121 F. Supp. 454 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ; Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441 (1955), petition for cert. filed, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3147
(U.S. Nov. 12, 1955) (No. 517) ; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Sandsberry, 277
S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
The following cases have upheld the constitutionality of § 2(11) of the RLA: In re
Florida East Coast Ry., 32 L.R.R.M. 2533 (S.D. Fla. 1953); Moore v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry., 34 L.R.R.M. 2666 (Hustings Ct., Richmond, Va. 1954). The single case holding the
statute unconstitutional is Hanson v. Union Pac. R.R., 71 N.W.2d 526 (Neb. 1955), appeal
docketed sub non. Railway Employees' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 350 U.S. 910 (1955).
9. 71 N.W.2d 526 (Neb. 1955), appeal docketed sub non. Railway Employees' Dep't,
AFL v. Hanson, 350 U.S. 910 (1955).
10. 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441 (1955), petition for cert. filed, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3147
(U.S. Nov. 12, 1955) (No.517).
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into union shop trade agreements with the unions representing their employees.
A number of the nonoperating employees, threatened with discharge for fail-
ure to comply with the agreements, brought suits to enjoin their enforcement,
alleging that such agreements violated the applicable state right to work laws
and the United States Constitution." In Hanson the Nebraska Supreme Court
held that section 2(11) constituted government action in authorizing a union
shop. The court reasoned that since the federal statute purported to invalidate
the state right to work law, a union shop "depended" on the federal statute
in Nebraska. 12 It held that section 2(11) violated the Fifth Amendment in
that union membership had no reasonable relation to equitable distribution of
collective bargaining costs, and that union dues, fees and assessments were not
a reasonable measure of such costs.13 In Hudson the Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that section 2(11) did not constitute government action, since it
was only permissive, not mandatory.14 Therefore, the court denied the existence
of any constitutional question. But the court stated by way of dictum that even
if the Constitution were applicable, it would not invalidate section 2 (11).15
The Hanson and Hudson cases present to the Supreme Court one aspect of
the perplexing question-when may acts of private groups be held to con-
stitutional standards? At first glance, the answer to this question is "never,"
and the United States Supreme Court has established precedent for this
conclusion.16 But in fact, that Court and many others have subjected some
11. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, V; NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 13; NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-217
(1952) ; N.C. CODE §§ 95-78 - 95-84 (1949). See note 7 supra.
The nonoperating employees were not as concerned with the requirement that all em-
ployees must join a union as they were with the provision of § 2(11) of the RLA authoriz-
ing an agreement requiring employees classified as nonoperating to transfer from one union
to another when a new job requires a change in the employees' craft or class. Such a
transfer is not required of operating employees under the Act. But in both Hanson v.
Union Pac. R.R., 71 N.W.2d 526, 544 (Neb. 1955), and Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441, 452 (1955), the courts held that there was no unreason-
able classification involved. A nonoperating employee is one engaged in work included in
a craft or class listed in the RLA, 44 STAT. 578 (1926), as amended, 45 U. :. §§ 153(h)
(2), (3), (4) (1952).
12. Hanson v. Union Pac. R.R., supra note 11, at 546-47. The court's theory of gov-
ernment action is specious. It states the effect of the statute, not the reason why the statute
constitutes government action. A union shop "depends" on § 2(11) of the RLA not only
in right to work states, but in all states, since the 1934 amendment to the RLA prohibited
a union shop in all states. See note 4 supra. A possible rationale for finding that § 2(11)
constitutes government action in right to work states is suggested in the text at note 32
infra. The "dependence" rationale states no more than the principle that federal laws are
supreme over state laws. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI; Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346
U.S. 485, 492-501 (1953) ; Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 581, 613 (1926).
13. Hanson v. Union Pac. R.R., 71 N.W.2d 526, 547 (Neb. 1955).
14. Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441, 452 (1955).
15. Id., 89 S.E.2d at 452-54.
16. It is accepted doctrine that the Constitution protects individuals only against gov-
ernment or public action, not against acts of private persons. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271
U.S. 323 (1926); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1884).
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private action to constitutional limitations on various grounds. One method,
prevalent in state courts, is to hold a contract void as contrary to public policy,
finding such policy in constitutional limitations.17 Less frequently, courts have
held that there would be unconstitutional state action if a court were to enforce
a contract abridging constitutional rights.'8 But the contract approach is not
consistently applied.'0 Another approach is to view the private party itself as
a governmental or quasi-governmental entity for constitutional purposes. This
view, as applied to labor unions, rests on the premise that since the union en-
acts economic legislation and performs administrative and judicial functions
within its organization, it is an independent governmental body and as such
subject to constitutional limitations.20 This theory has not been well received
17. E.g., Dooley v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 130 N.J. Eq. 75, 81, 21 A.2d 334, 338 (Ch.
1941) ; Cameron v. International Stage Employees, 118 N.J. Eq. 11, 176 AtI. 692 (Ch. 1935).
See Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries In-
flicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAw. GUILD REv. 627 (1946).
13. E.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
19. E.g., Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 245 Ala. 113, 16 So. 2d 416, rev'd, 323 U.S. 192
(1944) ; Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 302, 196 AtI. 330, 333 (1938) ; Note, 48 COLtM.
L. REV. 1241 (1948). See Wollett & Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor
Agreenzent, 7 STAN. L. REv. 445 (1955), as to whether a state court has jurisdiction over
a labor dispute, either as to substantive or adjective law.
Some writers have discouraged judicial intervention in labor disputes. Shulman, Reason,
Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999 (1955) ; Gregory, The Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and Scope, 29 WASH. U.L.Q. 3 (1949) ; Wil-
liams, The Political Liberties of Labor Union iembers, 32 TEXAS L. REV. 826 (1954).
One of the major inadequacies of the common law approach to the protection of individ-
ual rights relative to employment is that most courts have required that a person be a union
member or an employee before bringing suit to enjoin a discriminatory contract or action.
E.g., Murphy v. Higgins, 12 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct. 1939). Two states have not followed
this theory, however. Williams v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d
586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946) ; Carroll v. Local 269, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 133 N.J. Eq. 144, 147, 31 A.2d 223, 225 (Ch. 1943).
20. See, generally, MERRIAM, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1944) ; Jaffe, Law
Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201 (1937) ; Malick, Toward a New Con-
stitutional Status for Labor Unions: A Proposal, 21 RocKY MT. L. REV. 260 (1949);
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REV. 1049 (1951) ; Wirtz,
Government by Private Groups, 13 LA. L. REv. 440 (1953). See James v. Marinship
Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 740, 155 P.2d 329, 340 (1944). See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1940) (it is not clear whether the Court categorized the town, owned by Gulf Ship-
building Corp., as an independent government, or as an agent of government).
Unions are said to be legislative for the following reasons: (1) As exclusive bargain-
ing representatives for a craft, a union determines the rights of not only union, but non-
union employees, see Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 200-02 (1944); Wallace
Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944) ; (2) Neither union nor nonunion employees
are immediate parties to the agreements between employer and union; and (3) Such trade
agreements are given legal priority over the individual contract of employee with employer,
see J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944) (trade agreement compared to a
government regulation to which individual contracts must conform) ; Lenhoff, The Present
Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1109, 1137
(1941).
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by the courts.21 Where private action has been authorized by statute, some
courts have applied constitutional limitations to persons exercising such au-
thority by classifying them as government agents.2 2 This last analysis creates
difficulty in determining just when an agency relationship exists, and courts
have been reluctant to adopt it.
23
But while it may be possible under some circumstances to apply constitu-
tional limitations directly to "private" persons or groups,24 it was unnecessary
to do so in the Hanson and Hudson cases. For the question in these cases was
not whether the Constitution directly restricts private action, but whether it
restricts the power of Congress to enact permissive legislation. Despite in-
cautious dicta by several courts to the contrary, 25 this question must be an-
swered unqualifiedly in the affirmative. Certainly no rationale is apparent by
which Congress could validly enact legislation without reference to constitu-
tional grants of power and limitations on power. If a federal statute will
operate to deprive individuals or groups of rights secured by the Constitution,
it is invalid. And this conclusion should follow without regard to whether the
deprivation is physically accomplished by agents of government or by private
individuals using the congressional enactment as a shield.2 6 The enactment of
the statute authorizing invasion of private rights is the "government action"
upon which the Constitution operates.
21. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
22. Betts v. Easley, 161, Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946) (labor union held a govern-
ment agency). The following cases in dicta have compared a labor union to a govern-
ment agency: Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1944) ; Rolax v. At-
lantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 1951). But see American Communi-
cations Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (dictum) ; Courant v. International
Photographers, 176 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1949).
Courts have held other private persons and groups subject to constitutional limitations
by using an agency relationship. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ; Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649, 663, 666 (1944) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 (1932) ; Kerr
v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 49 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
For a discussion of whether a labor union is a government agency, see Hearings, supra
note 3, at 161; Hale, supra note 17; Notes, 61 HARv. L. Rtv. 344 (1948), 56 YALE L.J. 731
(1947), 58 HARV. L. REv. 448, 451 (1945).
23. See cases cited note 22 supra.
24. See notes 17-18, 20,22 supra.
25. Two state courts have stated that it is impossible to consider the constitutionality
of § 2(11) of the RLA since it is "permissive" in nature and not "mandatory," and con-
sequently it does not constitute affirmative government action to which the Constitution is
applicable. Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441, 452 (1955) ;
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Sandsberry, 277 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
Both cases relied on Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1953), which
did state that the constitutionality of § 2(11) could not be determined in New York. But
the facts in Otten differ from the above two cases in that New York does not have a state
right to work law. Since in addition a union shop was permissible in New York at com-
mon law, § 2(11), in authorizing a union shop, did not deprive Otten of any right which
he otherwise would have possessed. See note 29 infra and accompanying text.
26. See text at notes 16,22 supra.
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Although the Constitution invariably "applies" to permissive legislation, it
does not necessarily follow that a court must pass upon the constitutionality of
a permissive statute whenever it is asked to do so. The rule of avoiding con-
stitutional questions whenever possible, a principle which is itself of nearly
constitutional force, may require disposition of the case without reaching con-
stitutional issues.2 7 Thus in Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,28 cited by the court
in Hudson for the proposition that "merely permissive" legislation can raise
no constitutional issues, the Second Circuit refused to pass upon the constitu-
tionality of section 2(11) of the RLA. But Otten is distinguishable in one
crucial respect: unlike Hudson, it arose in a state where neither statutory nor
common law entitled the plaintiff to relief against a union shop.29 Since the
plaintiff had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, and since
section 2(11) could be raised only by way of defense, the court dismissed
plaintiff's claim on the merits, and held that it was unnecessary to reach the
question whether 2(11) was constitutional.30 Since a holding that 2(11) was
27. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 136 (1951) ;
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320 (1946) ; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (concurring opinion of Brandeis, J.).
28. 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953).
29. Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953), was decided under New
York law where a union shop is valid at common law. Williams v. Quill, 277 N.Y. 1, 12
N.E.2d 547 (1938). But Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441.
(1955), arose in North Carolina where a right to work law existed. See note 11 supra.
On facts similar to Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., supra, the court in Wicks v. Southern
Pac. Co., 121 F. Supp. 454 (S.D. Cal. 1954) held that § 2(11) presented no constitutional
issue.
The statute may determine the rights of a person if it deprives him of a remedy which
he formerly had against the authorized action. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S.
192, 200 (1944). The former remedy may have been based on a statute such as the right
to work law in Nebraska, supra note 11, or on the common law as suggested by Judge
Learned Hand in Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., supra. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312,329-30 (1921), where Chief Justice Taft stated:
"It is true that no one has a vested right in any particular rule of the common law,
but it is also true that the legislative power of the state can only be exerted in sub-
ordination to the fundamental principles of right and justice which the guaranty of
due process in the Fourteenth Amendment is intended to preserve, and that a purely
arbitrary and capricious exercise of that power whereby a wrongful and highly in-
jurious invasion of property rights, as here, is practically sanctioned and the owner
stripped of all real remedy, is wholly at variance with those principles."
If state right to work laws are unconstitutional due to absence of concurrent juris-
diction to control interstate railroad labor relations, such laws might be void ab initio.
Thus no rights of the employee would be abrogated by § 2(11) of the RLA. This rationale
is not, however, likely to be adopted. See note 7 supra.
30. In Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., ,supra note 29, Otten requested both a three-Judge
court and an injunction against enforcement of a union shop contract. Under the Federal
Judiciary Act, only a three-Judge court can declare a federal statute invalid. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2282 (1952). Thus, only because Otten requested such a court did the court here con-
sider whether a proper constitutional question was presented. Otherwise, the court would
have dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim without discussing the constitu-
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unconstitutional would not have entitled Otten to relief, it was unnecessary to
determine whether such a holding was warranted on the merits. In Hanson
and Hudson, on the other hand, the plaintiffs stated valid claims under state
right to work laws, and it became necessary to determine the validity of sec-
tion 2(11) as a defense.31 The court in Otten stated explicitly that a consti-
tutional question might well be presented if, as was the case in Hanson and
Hudson, the statutory or common law of the state would entitle the plaintiff
to an injunction against enforcement of union shop contracts but for 2 (11).a"
The suggested rationale creates the seeming paradox that a permissive
statute like the RLA may be subject to constitutional attack in some jurisdic-
tions but not in others. This paradox is, however, only a variant of the situa-
tion which obtains with respect to all legislation by virtue of the constitutional
provision restricting federal judicial power to "cases and controversies. '33
Thus a patently unconstitutional statute may go unchallenged for years if no
litigant appears who has been injured by it, and who has standing to litigate."'
In the case of a permissive statute, which can ordinarily be raised only by way
of defense,3 5 a plaintiff clearly must state a claim for relief before he can
challenge the validity of the defense. No justiciable issue is presented if the
permissive statute "permits" action which is permissible in any event. The
"affirmative government action" which has been sought by courts in permissive
statute cases is thus an essential prerequisite to a constitutional decision.3 1 And
tional issue. For under no law, either federal or state, did the plaintiff possess a valid
claim for relief against the imposition of the union shop, since a union shop is permissible
at common law in New York, and such law was applicable to Otten. In short, Otten had
no standing to litigate the constitutionality of § 2(11), since the statute did not injure him
by depriving him of the right to resist a union shop which the statute authorized. A plain-
tiff is not permitted to base his action solely on the invalidity of the defense. See HALF,
FREEDO THROUGH LAW 327-35 (1952).
31. See note 11 supra.
32. Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1953).
33. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
34. Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952) ; Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) ; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
35. Since a "permissive" statute does not make mandatory any particular act, a plain-
tiff could not use the statute to force the defendant to do a particular act. Therefore, the
merits of the statute would be placed in issue validly only by a defendant who seeks to
justify his actions under the authority granted by the statute.
36. On at least one occasion the Supreme Court has chosen to rule on the constitu-
tionality of a permissive statute when in fact no constitutional issue was presented. In
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 476 (1937), a Wisconsin statute au-
thorized a form of picketing which the Court apparently conceded was permitted at com-
mon law. The statute deprived no one of any right previously enjoyed, since if the statute
were held invalid, the authorized activity still could continue. But the Court decided the
constitutionality of the statute, contending that its validity was properly challenged under
the Fourteenth Amendment since the state courts had based their rulings on the authoriz-
ing statute.
In several more recent dicta the Court has apparently followed the seemingly erroneous
Senn rationale for determining when constitutional questions posed by a permissive statute
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such affirmative action is present only when the statute would, if upheld, defeat
a valid claim to relief against conduct by private parties which the statute au-
thorizes. Thus, in Hanson and Hudson section 2(11) purported to invalidate
state right to work laws and thereby to defeat plaintiffs' claims to relief against
enforcement of union shop contracts. This affirmative action is not, however,
required to subject permissive legislation to constitutional standards; it is a
requisite only of a judicial decision on the constitutionality of such legislation,
since without it, the rule of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions
would require disposition of the case on non-constitutional grounds.
a7
A problem of obvious importance in any controversy involving permissive
legislation is to determine precisely what the statute in question authorizes
Thus a statute merely repealing a prior statutory prohibition authorizes noth-
ing, and can raise no constitutional questions. It may be that such a statute
is not subject to constitutional restraints at all, since it merely withdraws gov-
ernmental power rather than asserts it.3s But in any event such a statute could
never present a justiciable issue: since the statute would leave a court at
liberty to grant or deny relief on common law grounds against the "permitted"
conduct, no plaintiff could ever complain that the statute exercised a neces-
sarily determinative effect on his claim.39 Similarly, a statute may authorize a
defendant to function as an entity or in a particular capacity, as statutory cor-
porate charters do, for example, yet not authorize the particular conduct
must be answered. In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1944), where
a statute authorized a union to act as exclusive bargaining representative for a particular
craft, the Court stated that had the statute not imposed an implied duty to represent all
craft members fairly, grave consitutional issues would arise. But before a constitutional
issue would arise, there must necessarily be a determination that the complainant has a
right under the statutory or common law of his state to enjoin enforcement of the au-
thorized conduct but for the authorizing statute. Since Steele's rights under state law
were not in issue in the court below, the Court presumably should have remanded the
case in order that such rights might be determined. Unless the complainant has been
deprived of a remedy by the permissive statute, he has not sustained any injury and has
no standing to litigate the constitutionality of the permissive statute. See note 30 supra.
But see note 37 infra. The Steele dictum may, however, be justifiable if it referred to the
constitutional questions discussed in note 40 infra and accompanying text, rather than to
any constitutional questions posed by the statute itself.
37. See note 27 supra. But the dictum in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra note 36,
may state a wise policy in that even though a "permissive" federal statute may not conflict
with any state law, it encourages the type of action authorized by the statute, and might
be said to influence a state legislature not to change its own laws, or influence a state
court not to change the common law of the state. But it is questionable that this approach
indicates an injury to a plaintiff sufficiently definite to invoke the jurisdiction of a court
to consider the constitutionality of the federal statute. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923). But see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1-936).
38. It has been suggested that if a state were to repeal its own law for the purpose
of encouraging discriminatory action and depriving a person of a remedy against it, such
a repeal would be unconstitutional. See Hale, supra note 17, at 636-37; Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944).
39. See text at note 32 supra.
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(perhaps carrying out a union shop contract) of which the plaintiff complains.
In such a case the plaintiff may argue that the defendant is directly subject to
the Constitution as a quasi-governmental entity or as a government agent ;40
or that a statute creating an entity with powers so sweeping as to include the
offending conduct is void as an unconstitutional delegation of governmental
power.41 He plainly may not, however, utilize the rationale previously out-
lined for "permissive" statutes unless the conduct of which he complains is ex-
pressly permitted by the statute. He may, in short, challenge the constitu-
tionality of the statute only to the extent that it necessarily constitutes a
defense against his claim.
42
Although the court in Hanson was correct in holding that it was obligated
to decide the constitutional question presented, its conclusion that section
2(11) was unconstitutional seems erroneous. The court conceded that federal
regulation of distribution of collective bargaining costs in the railroad industry
would be a reasonable exercise of the commerce power,43 but held that section
2(11)'s method of distributing such costs denied due process of law in two
respects. It held first that compulsory membership in a union is not reason-
ably related to distribution of collective bargaining costs, and second, that
union dues, fees and assessments are not a reasonable measure of these costs.
But compulsory membership does have a reasonable relation to distribution of
bargaining costs, since membership is a convenient and efficient means of col-
lecting such costs. 44 And union dues, fees and assessments are a reasonably
40. See notes 20, 22 supra; cf. Crossen v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 252, 269-72, 103 N.E.
2d 769, 777-78 (1951).
41.. Congress cannot delegate its power to legislate, except when such delegation is
limited by definite standards enabling Congress, the courts and the people to judge whether
the agency exercising the delegated power has exceeded the authority delegated. Yakus
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) ; A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935). In dictum, the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323
U.S. 192, 198 (1944), indicated that were the power granted by the RLA to a union-to
represent exclusively a particular craft-not accompanied by an implied duty to represent
all members of that craft fairly, grave constitutional questions would arise. The Court
seemed to indicate that it would base such a constitutional issue on that delegation of
power. See HALE, op. cit. supra note 30, at 348-66. But see note 36 supra, for other possible
bases for the constitutional issues which the Court thought might arise. As to whether a
particular power is legislative in nature, see note 20 supra.
42. See text at notes 32,34 supra.
43. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31, 37 (1936); Virginian
Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 553 (1936) ; Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Rail-
way Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570 (1929).
44. The guaranty of due process demands only that a law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial rela-
tion to the object sought to be obtained. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
See Note, 30 COLUm. L. REv. 360 (1930).
Since most railroad employees were union members prior to § 2(11), a requirement
that the small minority of employees join the majority of employees is a convenient and
ready solution to the problem of distributing bargaining costs. Hearings, supra note 3, at
4, 114; NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, 19TH ANN. REP. 9-10 (1953); H.R. Rm'. No. 2811,
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accurate measure of bargaining costs. They are used to support unionism
generally, which is essential to continuation of the bargaining process. 45 This
is so even if such funds are used for political purposes, for political activity is
a legitimate if not indispensable means of advancing the cause of organized
labor.
46
The court in Hanson also suggested that compulsory membership infringes
on an employee's freedom of assembly and right to work protected by the
First and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. Section 2(11) does
not abridge the First Amendment in denying to an employee the right not to
associate.47 Freedom of assembly does not include the right to remain un-
organized. 48 Employment is a contractual relationship, and it has long been
clear that freedom of contract is not absolute.49 There being no constitutional
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (between 75-80% of railroad employees were union members
prior to enactment of § 2(11) in 1951) ; 96 CONG. Rzc. 17050 (1951).
45. In passing § 2(11) of the RLA, Congress intended to eliminate "freeriders" who
were deriving benefits from collective bargaining strength of unions but were contributing
nothing to support unions financially. Hearings, supra note 3, at 6, 15-16, 130. Stability
of income is essential to balance the equation between management and labor. See Colgate-
Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355, 362-64 (1949) ; Williams v. Quill, 277 N.Y.
1, 9-10, 12 N.E.2d 547, 550-51 (1938) ; CIO, THE CASE AGAINST "RIGHT To WoR" LAWS
145 (1955) ; Note, 40 IowA L. Ray. 627, 636, 641 (1955).
46. Collection of funds for political purposes does not abridge free speech so long as
unions do not represent that their political views are those of all their members. DeMille
v. American Federation of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947). But if a
union does so represent, a contributing member having a contrary personal belief should
be able to enjoin such a false representation or any attempt to discharge him for refusal
to contribute, if the intent to represent is made known prior to collection of a political
assessment. See ibid.
Several unions have endeavored to confine the imposition of dues, fees and assessments
to a narrow concept of bargaining costs, disallowing political assessments. Hearings,
supra note 3, at 33. The CIO-AFL merger agreement provides for a Civil Rights Com-
mittee, 78 MONTHrLY LAB. REV. 1018 (1955), which might control political assessments.
Unlike the RLA, see note 1 supra, the Taft-Hartley Act, see note 5 supra, omits the
term "assessments." Of course the scope of "dues" and "fees" is not standardized, and
might be applied as broadly as "assessments." See Rosenthal, The National Labor Rela-
tions Act and Compulsory Unionism, 1954 Wis. L. Rv. 53, 71; Williams, supra note 19;
96 CONG. Rzc. 17049-50 (1950).
47. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
48. See AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 557, 559 (1949) (concurr-
ing opinion); Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 480 (1937); DeMille
v. American Federation of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 154, 187 P.2d 769, 779 (1947).
Some doubt has been expressed as to whether freedom of association is part of the free-
dom of assembly protected by the First Amendment. See, generally, Abernathy, Right of
Association, 6 S.C.L.Q. 32,33-34, 49-59 (1953). In Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. North-
western Co., 335 U.S. 525, 531 (1949), the Court, in holding that union members have no
constitutional right to require non-members to join their union, speaks of "participation
in union assemblies" "to discuss and formulate plans," and not mere identification with a
union through payment of dues, fees and assessments, which is the only degree of union
affiliation required by the RLA.
49. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
19561
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
right involved, but rather a clash of interests between the organized and the
unorganized, it is within the special province of the legislature to draw the
line of desirable social policy,50 which it has done by enacting section 2(11).
And even if compulsory membership does to some extent restrict freedom of
assembly, the restriction is so slight as clearly to be outweighed by the benefits
thought by Congress to inhere in union membership.r' Section 2(11) curtails
the freedom not to associate only to the extent of requiring identification with
the union for purposes of collecting dues, fees and assessments, not in demand-
ing active participation.
5 2
Neither can it be said that section 2(11) infringes upon the employee's
right to work.53  Historically, a right to work has denoted opportunity to
follow a freely chosen occupation.54 The R LA has established safeguards
against the infringement of this right by the employer or the union. Section
2(11) permits only a limited union shop. Racial and internal disciplinary
policies of a union are prohibited grounds on which to base initiation or
termination of employment.55 Indeed, the sole permissible basis for discharge
from employment which may arise from union affiliation is failure to pay union
dues, fees and assessments.5 6 Although the bargaining representative has au-
thority to enter into a union shop trade agreement, the employees may discon-
tinue the agreement.57 The employer is free to choose from an unrestricted
labor market. Other parts of the act augment the protections of section 2(11)
by providing for administrative and judicial review of grievances.56
Unlike section 2(11), state right to work laws tend to upset the balance of
power between management and labor by prohibiting unions from assuring
50. See AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 546 (1949).
51. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399-400 (1950);
Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 558 (1937).
52. See note 48 supra; cf. Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 68.
53. The right to work is protected by U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. See Smith v. Texas,
233 U.S. 630, 636 (1914); Newman, The Closed Union and the Right to Work, 43
CoLUM. L REv. 42, 43 (1943).
54. See Lenhoff, The Right To Work: Here And Abroad, 46 ILL. L. REv. 669 (1951).
55. See note 1 supra. As of 1950, four national railroad unions were said to exclude
negroes from membership due to provisions in the union constitution or bylaws. Such
uinions represent a quarter million employees. Hearings, supra note 3, at 24-25.
56. See note 1 sucpra.
57. 44 STAT. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1952). Cf. Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, § 9(e) (1), 65 STAT. 601-02 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1) (1952),
amending 49 STAT. 45 (1935).
By analogy, the "contract bar" rule used by the NLRB would not prevent a "deau-
thorization" election under the RLA. The rule does not apply to union security agree-
ments. See Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1952).
58. 44 STAT. 577-78, 580, 582, 585-86 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152-53, 155-57,
159-60 (1952). It has been held that an employee need not exhaust all his remedies under




themselves of stability of income and membership.59 Moreover, evidence in-
dicates that state right to work laws have made no positive contribution to the
improvement of labor-management relations, the status of the worker, or the
economic welfare of the states having such laws.60 The Railway Labor Act,
through section 2(11), encourages a reasonable union security that is essential
to union existence and improvement of labor standards.6'
59. State right to work laws tend to impede the progress of employee interests by
depriving unions of strength inherent in stable membership and income. This necessitates
a greater degree of government regulation of labor-management relations, similar to Euro-
pean labor policy, but contrary to congressional intent and United States labor history.
See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944) ; CIO, op. cit. supra note 45; Jen-
sen, Notes on the Beginnings of Collective Bargaining, 9 IND. & LA. REL. REV. 225
(1956) ; Lenhoff, supra note 54; Taylor, Has Collective Bargaining Failed?, 248 ANNALS
154 (1946) ; Harv. L. Sch. Rec. No. 9, Nov. 24, 1954, p. 1, col. 2, p. 4, col. 2.
60. See CIO, op. cit. supra note 45, at 161; Cheit, Union Security and the Right to
Vork, 6 LAB. L.J. 357 (1955) ; Kuhlman, Right to Work Laws: The Virginia Experience,
6 LAB. L.J. 453 (1955) ; Levinson, Union Shop Under the Railway Labor Act, 6 LAB. L.J.
441 (1955) ; Meyers, Effects of "Right-to-Work" Laws: A Study of the Texas Act, 9 IND.
& LAB. REL. REv. 77 (1955) ; Taylor, supra note 59.
61. See note 59 mupra; BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 93 (1934).
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